Etymologically, the term “phenomenon” means “that which appears” and logos means “word or study.” On first sight, then, the term “phenomenology” seems to be formed like “psycho-logy,” “socio-logy,” “bio-logy,” and so on. The first part of the word refers to the subject or domain of study: psyche (spirit, soul), socio (society, community), bio (life), and so on. The second part, “logos,” designates the science or inquiry into the domains of the subjects of the psyche, social, or bios. However, Heidegger has pointed out that phenomenology does not have a subject matter or subject domain in the same sense as psychology, biology, or sociology—a phenomenon is not a subject in a disciplinary sense. In the methodological Introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger carefully unpacks his provisional ontological formulation of the etymological meaning of the Greek word phenomenology. He points out that logos means to let something be seen and phenomenon means that which shows itself from itself. “Hence phenomenology means: to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself. That is the formal meaning of the type of research that calls itself “phenomenology.” But this expresses nothing other than the maxim formulated above: “To the things themselves!” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 32)