Much of Heidegger’s work is concerned with the question of how philosophy is possible in view of the realization that human life is radically finite and always involved in dynamic change. When we describe a thing, then we tend to assume that this thing has a permanent identity and a permanent presence. However, nothing is ever the same or unchanging. So how then can philosophy describe the things of our world and let life appear to itself? Heidegger is self-consciously aware of the difficulty that is known in philosophy as the problem of thematization. Phenomenological thematization and description inevitably do violence to lived experience by unwittingly bringing experience to a halt. We cannot really capture experience in its unfolding in time. The problem is that epistemological forms of thematization confuse the nonprimordial (conceptual objectifications) for the primordial (nonconceptual meanings) dimensions of experience as they are lived through. For example, when I look at the clock on my wall and I describe the experience of the clock, I may be inclined to use conceptual terms such as time—hours—minutes—dial—hands—metal—glass—thing. However, these descriptive concepts increasingly thematize and objectify the clock and thereby impoverish the mundane character and experiential meaningfulness of the timepiece as it hangs on my wall. The problem is that the objectifying activity of describing the clock is actually a de-living experience: only leaving a residue of the originally subtle, complex, and rich primordial experience of temporality. Instead, I should try to describe the clock in its own being, as it shows itself to me in lived experience, unmediated by conceptual objectifications and abstractions.