For Husserl, phenomenology is a rigorous human science precisely because it investigates the way that knowledge comes into being and confronts us with the assumptions upon which all human understandings are grounded. He borrowed the notion of intentionality from Brentano in order to explain the intentional structure of all consciousness. By intentionality he means that all our thinking, feeling, and acting are always “about” things in the world, and thus tie us to the world. Brentano was a scholar who attempted to develop a descriptive psychology that involved the notion of consciousness as inner perception. For Brentano, all mental phenomena are conscious and experienced as “inner perceptions” made up of presentational appearances or presentings. Brentano’s contemporaries challenged the idea of consciousness as inner perceptions (for example, we cannot gain access to inner perceptions through introspective accounts). But Husserl spent much effort trying to show how things held by certain sources in consciousness are experienced with various types of evidence. The important upshot is that “the experience of an object” is given differently from “the object of an experience.” Our experience of the object of the dice is given to us internally with an intuitive certainty that differs from the uncertainty of the external object, the “real” die that is lying in front of us on the table. But the nature of the external die is ultimately uncertain because we can never see it from all sides at once. As we walk around it or turn it in our hand its true reality can never be given with certainty. In contrast, the die that appears to me in consciousness is certainly a true die; if it were not, then we would call it something else. So, phenomenology does not direct its reflective attention to the external die but to our experience of the die, or better to the way that the die appears in consciousness. And this is a crucial point for Husserlian phenomenology. Put somewhat awkwardly, phenomenology does not study the “what” of our experience but the “experience” of the what—the experience of the intentional object, thing, entity, event as it appears or gives itself in consciousness. Phenomenology is the study of phenomena, and the phenomena are someone’s experiences—belonging to someone’s stream of consciousness. For Husserlian phenomenological inquiry, experience is the thing and “how” the things of experience appear to consciousness is the intentional focus.