For Heidegger the method of ontology is phenomenology. So, for Heidegger phenomenology requires of its practitioners a heedful attunement to the modes of being of the ways that things are in the world.
“Phenomenology” means—to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of that branch of research that calls itself “phenomenology”. But here we are expressing nothing else than the maxim . . . “To the things themselves!” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 58).
Much of Heidegger’s work is concerned with the question of how philosophy is possible in view of the realization that human life is radically finite and always involved in dynamic change. When we describe a thing, then we tend to assume that this thing has a permanent identity and a permanent presence. However, nothing is ever the same or unchanging. So how then can philosophy describe the things of our world and let life appear to itself? Heidegger is self-consciously aware of the difficulty that is known in philosophy as the problem of thematization.
In Being and Time, Heidegger (1962, 2010) distinguishes between two kinds of modalities of things. These modalities are not different aspects or entities of things but different relations that we engage with things. Things that are zuhanden are relationally “ready-to-hand” as tools or equipment; things that are vorhanden are relationally “present-at-hand” as objects of contemplation or reflection. The difference lies in using a thing versus thinking about a thing. In everyday life we are generally involved with the things of our world in a taken-for-granted manner of ready-to-hand. When I pour a cup of coffee, I am not reflecting on the coffee jar or coffee machine; when I drink from the coffee cup, I am not reflecting about the nature of a cup. But, at times, we are indeed struck by the presence of such things.
Heidegger gives the famous example of a hammer and how we suddenly notice the nature of the hammer when it breaks. Similarly, I may reflect on the existential, cultural, and technical appearance of the jar or the coffee cup made from porcelain or from some other material. And in reflecting on these things, my relation to the thing changes from zuhanden to vorhanden, from ready-to-hand to present-at-hand. A phenomenology of the things of our world concerns itself with the nearness and distance in the way we position things and they position themselves. But nearness does not just mean close, and distance does not just mean far away. Nearness is the presencing of things in our lives. Only in this positioning of things do they become accessible. Positionality becomes a critical notion in Heidegger’s reflections on the way that the meaning of things involves a showing and hiding, a concealing and unconcealing of their meaning and significance.
One of the most provocative and contested issues that Heidegger raises is contained in his thinking about technology and ontotheology.
In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger shows that technology should not just be simply interpreted as the tools and techniques that we use to produce things. He famously says, there is nothing technological about technology. Rather, we need to see that technology has become the ontotheology of our modern existence. Technology makes the world appear to us as standing reserve that we can exploit and use for our consuming wants and desires. Heidegger speaks of the danger of technology and that we need to understand how it has profoundly shaped our spiritual, social, and physical existence. Philosophers of technology such as Feenberg (1999) have critiqued Heidegger for exaggerating the threats that technology poses for human existence. More positively oriented critics, such as Iain Thomson (2000), show how Heidegger’s phenomenology of technology contains many profound insights that are worth studying and heeding and that require our thoughtful response.
Selected Readings:
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. (J. MacQuarrie and E. Robinson, transl.) New York: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1971). Poetry, Language, Thought. New York: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1971). On the Way to Language. New York: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1977). The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1982). The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1985). History of the Concept of Time. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1994). Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic.” Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1995). The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1998). Parmenides. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1999). Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning). (P. Emad and K. Maly, transl.) Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (2000). Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry. (K. Hoeller, transl.) Amherst, NY: Humanities Books.
Heidegger, M. (2001). Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression. New York: Continuum.
Heidegger, M. (2010). Being and Time. (J. Stambaugh, transl.) New York: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (2011). Introduction to Philosophy—Thinking and Poetizing. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (2012). Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insights into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking. (A. J. Mitchell, transl.) Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (2012). Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event). (R. Rojcewicz and D. Vallega-Neu, transl.) Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (2013). Basic Problems of Phenomenology—Winter Semester 1919/1920. New York: Bloomsbury.
Heidegger, M. (2013). The Event. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (2014). Gesamtausgabe (HGA) [Complete Edition] 96, pp. 216–217.